{"id":58588,"date":"2026-11-18T01:37:24","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T01:37:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/?p=58588"},"modified":"2026-11-20T09:38:12","modified_gmt":"2026-11-20T09:38:12","slug":"medical-device-cybersecurity-fda-guide","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/medical-device-cybersecurity-fda-guide\/","title":{"rendered":"Medical Device Cybersecurity: A Guide to FDA and EU Rules"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Cybersecurity evidence belongs in the safety case, not in a separate folder. Trace each threat to a hazard, the control that addresses it, and the verification evidence a reviewer can inspect. The FDA expects an SBOM for cyber devices, while the EU MDR does not name one and instead expects state-of-the-art software and documented vulnerability handling.<\/p>\n<h2>Medical Device Cybersecurity Requirements by Market and Activity<\/h2>\n<p>The US and the EU ask for the same underlying engineering work and file it differently. The FDA wants secure design, an SBOM and a vulnerability-handling process before it will authorise a cyber device. The EU MDR folds IT security into the general safety and performance requirements that a notified body assesses against the technical documentation. Teams that build the evidence once and map it twice spend far less time on submissions than teams that write a separate security pack per market.<\/p>\n<p><figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/medical-device-cybersecurity-engineer-laboratory.jpg\" alt=\"A professional engineer works in a lab alongside medical device cybersecurity documentation and a digital infusion pump.\" \/><\/figure><\/p>\n<p>Six activities carry most of the weight in a review. The table maps each one to the FDA expectation under section 524B and the premarket guidance, and to the MDR reference a reviewer will look for.<\/p>\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table><tr>\n<th>Activity<\/th>\n<th>FDA expectation (section 524B and premarket guidance)<\/th>\n<th>EU MDR reference<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Security risk assessment<\/td>\n<td>Threat model tied to safety and essential performance, documented in the submission<\/td>\n<td>Security risks handled within the risk management process and the ISO 14971 risk file<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Secure design and development<\/td>\n<td>Documented security architecture, controls and trust boundaries<\/td>\n<td>Annex I 17.2 and 17.4 require state-of-the-art software and name information security in the development life cycle<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Software component inventory<\/td>\n<td>SBOM covering commercial, open-source and off-the-shelf software in cyber devices<\/td>\n<td>Not named in the MDR text; confirm against current MDCG guidance<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Vulnerability monitoring and disclosure<\/td>\n<td>Postmarket monitoring plan and coordinated vulnerability disclosure process<\/td>\n<td>Not named explicitly; handled through post-market surveillance and vigilance reporting<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Patch and update process<\/td>\n<td>Timely, authenticated security updates and a documented patch plan<\/td>\n<td>Annex I 17.4 plus change control; a significant change goes back to the notified body<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Verification evidence<\/td>\n<td>Security testing and penetration results reviewed as part of the submission<\/td>\n<td>Verification records kept under design controls and the technical documentation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/figure>\n<h3>Reading the gaps in the table<\/h3>\n<p>Two cells are honest about the regulation rather than flattering it. The MDR does not use the term SBOM, and it does not spell out a coordinated disclosure process. That absence does not make the artefacts optional. A notified body assessing state-of-the-art software will ask how components are tracked and how a researcher reports a flaw, and an SBOM plus a public disclosure policy is the cleanest answer available.<\/p>\n<p>Confirm the current wording on fda.gov and in the European Commission&#039;s MDCG documents before you quote either instrument in a file. The standards that decide how deep each activity goes are IEC 81001-5-1, AAMI TIR57 and IEC 62304. The engineering work that produces the evidence starts long before a submission, as our guide to medical device software development sets out.<\/p>\n<h2>Why Connected Devices and SaMD Become Targets<\/h2>\n<p>A flaw in a bedside monitor matters because of what it can reach. If an attacker alters a therapy parameter, suppresses an alarm, or takes a device offline mid-infusion, the failure is clinical, and the root cause is software.<\/p>\n<p>Four conditions keep connected devices exposed. Remote access for service and monitoring keeps a live path into clinical networks. Flat hospital segments let one compromised device reach its neighbours. Legacy operating systems run past the date the vendor will patch them on any fixed schedule. Third-party and open-source components carry inherited vulnerabilities that the manufacturer still has to track and answer for.<\/p>\n<p>SaMD inherits a different attack surface. Software running on cloud infrastructure takes on the security posture of that cloud account, and software running on a patient&#039;s phone takes on the phone. Neither platform is under your change control, so your threat model has to treat both as untrusted.<\/p>\n<p>The scale is documented. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/s41598-023-45927-1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A 2023 peer-reviewed analysis of devices bought by national health services examined<\/a> 14,478 procurement records covering 202 medical-device types and 1,241 healthcare facilities against 150 known vulnerabilities. Of those vulnerabilities, 42% were medium severity, 36% high, 20% critical, and only 0.4% low under CVSS. Severity alone does not set priority, because a medium flaw that reaches a therapy setting outranks a critical one in a logging service.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Practical rule.<\/strong> Score a finding twice. Once as a software flaw, once as a hazard to the patient. The second score decides the release date.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Hospital-side controls sit with the operator, and we cover those separately in our guide to healthcare data security best practices. For the device side, the exposure pattern across networks is worth reading in our piece on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/iot-vulnerabilities-in-healthcare\/\">IoT vulnerabilities in healthcare<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>US Requirements Under Section 524B and FDA Premarket Guidance<\/h2>\n<p>The statutory anchor is section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gao.gov\/assets\/d24106683.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">In December 2022, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 amended the Act<\/a> to give the FDA explicit authority over cybersecurity for medical devices, and for new devices submitted from March 2023 onward, manufacturers must provide plans for monitoring, identifying, and addressing postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The same amendment covers coordinated vulnerability disclosure, cyber-risk management, and timely security updates and patches.<\/p>\n<p><figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/medical-device-cybersecurity-regulatory-compliance.jpg\" alt=\"A graphic explaining US FDA requirements for medical device cybersecurity including legislative and submission standards.\" \/><\/figure><\/p>\n<h3>The four content obligations<\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li><p><strong>A postmarket monitoring plan<\/strong> naming how you identify, assess, and address vulnerabilities after release.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>A coordinated vulnerability disclosure process<\/strong> with a route in for researchers and a route out for advisories.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>An SBOM<\/strong> covering commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf software in the device.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Update and patch processes<\/strong> that give reasonable assurance the device stays secure in the field.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h3>What reviewers open first<\/h3>\n<p>The premarket guidance is where the file gets judged. Reviewers look for a threat model, a security risk management report, architecture views with trust boundaries, and an assurance case that ties each security claim to evidence. Check the latest version of that guidance on fda.gov before you write anything, because it is revised and reviewers work from the current text rather than from the version your consultant learned.<\/p>\n<p>Scope has a date in it. Devices submitted before March 2023 are generally not covered, unless a later marketing application covers significant changes to the device. That leaves a large installed base outside the statute and inside every hospital&#039;s procurement questionnaire.<\/p>\n<p>The practical effect on the file is simple. Build one traceable security section per submission, linked forward to hazards and backward to verification records, and stop maintaining a parallel security document that nobody can reconcile at review.<\/p>\n<h2>EU Requirements Under MDR Annex I, MDCG 2019-16 and the CRA<\/h2>\n<p>The MDR places cybersecurity within its general safety and performance requirements. Annex I sections 17.2 and 17.4 address electronic programmable systems; section 17.4 names information security alongside the development life cycle, risk management, verification and validation. Use the official regulation text when mapping these requirements to the technical file. Summaries can omit qualifiers that matter during review.<\/p>\n<p>MDCG 2019-16 explains how to address cybersecurity across the device life cycle and document it in the technical file. Check the current revision on the Commission&#039;s MDCG pages before citing it. The reviewer should be able to trace each security activity to its evidence and to the relevant safety risk.<\/p>\n<h3>The operator carries part of the risk<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/health.ec.europa.eu\/document\/download\/b23b362f-8a56-434c-922a-5b3ca4d0a7a1_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Commission guidance<\/a> assigns the operator responsibility for procurement and for maintaining security during operation and use, particularly when environmental changes or user interaction could compromise the medical-device system. Deployment documentation, access control, network configuration and update practices can all affect security after installation. Instructions for use and labelling should therefore state the operator&#039;s security responsibilities and the controls needed to support safe use.<\/p>\n<p>For the technical file, connect those instructions to the safety risk file. A reviewer should be able to follow the chain from a security-related hazard, through the control assigned to the operator, to the information provided for deployment and use.<\/p>\n<h3>Where the Cyber Resilience Act stops and starts<\/h3>\n<p>The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) applies to products with digital elements, while medical devices regulated under the MDR and IVDR are excluded from its scope. Companion apps, separate cloud services and other connected products may require a separate scope assessment. Check the CRA&#039;s scope article and recitals in the official text rather than relying on a summary.<\/p>\n<p>NIS2 scope and representation obligations are a separate question. If your organisation may fall within NIS2, use official EU legal material to assess applicability and <a href=\"https:\/\/dilicheckrep.com\/nis2-representative\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">find a NIS2 authorised representative<\/a> where representation is required.<\/p>\n<h3>One scope decision per product line<\/h3>\n<p>List each product line, companion app and cloud service, then record the applicable regime and the reasoning. Make the decision before drafting the technical file: it determines which documentation set the team must maintain. For each in-scope device, map security activities to evidence a reviewer can inspect, such as risk analysis, verification records, deployment instructions and post-release controls, and link that evidence to the safety risk file. Check UK and Canadian requirements against MHRA and Health Canada materials directly.<\/p>\n<h2>Standards That Link Security Life Cycles to Safety Risk<\/h2>\n<p>Three documents answer three different questions, and teams get into trouble when they use one as a substitute for another.<\/p>\n<p><strong>IEC 81001-5-1<\/strong> describes security activities across the health software life cycle, from planning and development through maintenance and retirement. Reviewers recognise its structure, which makes it the cheapest way to show that security is a process rather than a burst of activity before submission.<\/p>\n<p><strong>IEC 62304<\/strong> covers software life cycle processes and sets the safety classification that decides how much rigour each software item earns. Its classification is the practical lever often overlooked. A Class C item inherited from a therapy delivery function needs deeper security analysis than a Class A logging utility, and the same threat model should reflect that difference.<\/p>\n<p><strong>AAMI TIR57<\/strong> provides a method for security risk management of medical devices. Its value is in how it feeds ISO 14971. A threat becomes a hazard situation; the hazard receives a severity and a probability, and the control is verified and traced to a requirement in the same file.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Security risks are an additional source of hazards, so they belong in the risk management file, not in a companion document that references it.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The flow is short enough to state in one line and long enough to take a quarter to do properly. Threat, hazard situation, severity and probability, control, verification evidence, residual risk decision. Every step produces an artefact a reviewer can open.<\/p>\n<p>For the software classification context behind these choices, our guide to IEC 62304 walks through the classes, and the documentation they demand, and our article on software as a medical device covers how qualification decisions change the file. Confirm current editions before citing any standard, and check its status on the FDA-recognised consensus standards list and in the EU harmonised standards framework.<\/p>\n<h2>How to Build Security Into the Development Life Cycle<\/h2>\n<p>The work runs in a fixed order, and skipping the first step costs more than it saves.<\/p>\n<p><figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/medical-device-cybersecurity-development-lifecycle.jpg\" alt=\"A six-step infographic illustrating a secure development life cycle for creating secure medical devices.\" \/><\/figure><\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><p><strong>Map assets, data flows and trust boundaries:<\/strong> Every later control depends on this map, including the firewall rules and the encryption decisions.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Run a threat model on the architecture<\/strong> with a named method such as STRIDE. Record attackers, entry points, and the safety effect of each failure, not just the technical impact.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Convert threats into security requirements<\/strong> and link each one to a hazard in the risk file. The FDA guidance is direct on why. An otherwise moderate flaw can create high patient risk when it can alter therapy parameters, suppress alarms, corrupt diagnostic data, or interrupt availability, so a generic CVSS score cannot set priority (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fda.gov\/media\/119933\/download\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FDA premarket cybersecurity guidance<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Apply secure coding rules, peer review, and static analysis in the pipeline:<\/strong> Pick tools the team will reliably keep running, whether that&#039;s CodeQL, Semgrep, or a commercial analyser, and gate merges on new high-severity findings only. Encryption, access control, and audit logging go in from the first sprint, since retrofitting them touches every interface.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Generate the SBOM from the build pipeline on every release<\/strong>, in CycloneDX or SPDX, rather than assembling a spreadsheet at submission. The pipeline knows the dependency graph. A person reconstructing it six months later does not.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Run penetration testing and vulnerability assessment before release<\/strong>, including the update mechanism and the pairing flow, and route findings back into the risk file as new hazard inputs.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Update the security risk management report and the verification records together<\/strong>, so the claim and its evidence carry the same version.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Write labelling and user documentation<\/strong> that states the intended configuration, the update procedure, and the support end date. The operator needs those three facts to deploy the device safely.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Step three is the one I would protect hardest. Once a threat carries a hazard reference, prioritisation stops being an argument and becomes a lookup. For the engineering process around these steps, our guide to software engineering for medical device software covers the development and verification discipline, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/medical-device-software-integration\/\">medical device software integration<\/a> covers the interface work that tends to expand the attack surface late.<\/p>\n<h2>Post-Market Vulnerability Monitoring, Disclosure and Patch Planning<\/h2>\n<p>Exposure after release is measurable. <a href=\"https:\/\/censys.com\/blog\/a-closer-look-at-healthcare-cybersecurity-trends-new-research-shared-at-health-isac-fall-americas-summit\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">In November 2024, Censys found<\/a> more than 100 medical devices and systems publicly exposed to the internet across 12 US healthcare organizations, and one vendor accounted for 90% of those exposures. A device that answers on a public address has moved outside every control the design assumed.<\/p>\n<p><figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/medical-device-cybersecurity-hospital-monitoring.jpg\" alt=\"A biomedical engineer monitors hospital network security and patient devices on large screens in an office.\" \/><\/figure><\/p>\n<p>The operating workflow has six repeating steps.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><p><strong>Keep a versioned asset inventory and SBOM for every released build<\/strong>, keyed to serial numbers and firmware versions in the field.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Monitor feeds and match findings to components.<\/strong> Watch the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue for exploitation in the wild and match each entry against your component inventory.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Triage by device-level and patient impact<\/strong>, using the hazard links built during development.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Publish a coordinated disclosure policy<\/strong> with a named contact and a response commitment, following ISO\/IEC 29147 as the reference structure.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Choose a remediation path<\/strong> of patch, configuration change, or compensating control, and record why the chosen path is sufficient.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Set and communicate end-of-support dates<\/strong> well before components stop receiving fixes.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h3>The patch plan a reviewer will accept<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><p><strong>Scope:<\/strong> Names the products, versions, and components affected.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Timeline:<\/strong> States the regular cycle and the out-of-cycle route for critical findings.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Validation:<\/strong> Shows how the patch was tested against clinical functions, not only against the software build.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Rollback:<\/strong> Describes the route back if the patch causes a field failure.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li><p><strong>Compensating controls:<\/strong> Covers devices that cannot take the patch at all.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The question hospital teams ask most often is what happens when a patch conflicts with clinical availability. The manufacturer supplies the patch, its validation evidence, and a documented compensating control. The operator makes the deployment decision after its own risk assessment, which is the split the Commission guidance describes. Our healthcare IoT application case study shows how connected-device support continues past go-live, and the wider automation picture sits in our guide to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/healthcare-cybersecurity-automation\/\">healthcare cybersecurity automation<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>Close Security Gaps Before Your Next Submission<\/h2>\n<p>Before the technical file freezes, check that each security activity has an evidence item, a link to the safety risk file, and a clear owner. The table below turns common gaps into specific actions.<\/p>\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table><tr>\n<th>Gap<\/th>\n<th>Fix<\/th>\n<th>Owner<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Threat model not linked to hazards<\/td>\n<td>Add a hazard reference to each threat and control<\/td>\n<td>R&amp;D with QA\/RA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>SBOM generated once at submission<\/td>\n<td>Generate the SBOM from the build pipeline for each release<\/td>\n<td>R&amp;D<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>No patch route for legacy operating systems<\/td>\n<td>Document a patch, configuration, or compensating-control path for each platform<\/td>\n<td>Product security<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>No coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy or contact<\/td>\n<td>Publish a policy with a named contact point<\/td>\n<td>Product security<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Labelling omits update procedure or support end date<\/td>\n<td>Add the update procedure and support end date to labelling<\/td>\n<td>QA\/RA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Third-party components have no named owner<\/td>\n<td>Assign an owner to each component and its update source<\/td>\n<td>R&amp;D<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>No written Cyber Resilience Act scope decision<\/td>\n<td>Record which regime applies to each product line and companion app<\/td>\n<td>QA\/RA<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table><\/figure>\n<p>Prioritise fixes by patient impact, then by submission date. A missing disclosure contact can be addressed quickly. Establishing a patch route for a legacy operating system may require more work, so record the plan and its effect on the product&#039;s security claims.<\/p>\n<p>Bridge Global builds secure healthcare software with MDR, FDA, HIPAA, and ISO requirements designed in from the start. Its work includes secure design, threat assessment, and an evidence trail that connects security decisions to product risks. To discuss your next submission, contact the team through <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/healthcare\">custom healthcare software development<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<h3>Does section 524B apply to a device submitted before March 2023?<\/h3>\n<p>Generally, no. Devices submitted before March 2023 are outside the requirement unless a later marketing application covers significant changes. Confirm the position for the specific product against current FDA guidance before planning the file.<\/p>\n<h3>Does the Cyber Resilience Act apply to our medical device software?<\/h3>\n<p>Devices regulated under the MDR and IVDR are excluded from the CRA. Companion apps, separate cloud services, and other connected products may fall within scope. Check the official text for each product you sell.<\/p>\n<h3>Does the EU MDR require an SBOM?<\/h3>\n<p>The MDR text does not name an SBOM directly. It can support evidence for the state-of-the-art software requirement in Annex I. Check current expectations against MDCG 2019-16 and your notified body&#039;s position.<\/p>\n<h3>Who patches a device after it is installed in a hospital?<\/h3>\n<p>The manufacturer provides the patch capability, validation evidence, and documentation. The operator is responsible for maintaining security during operation and use, including deciding when to deploy a patch in a clinical environment.<\/p>\n<h3>Where should security evidence sit, in its own file or in the risk management file?<\/h3>\n<p>Keep security evidence in the risk management file alongside the safety evidence, linking each threat to a hazard. A short security section can summarise the claims and point to the relevant records, maintaining one source of truth for review.<\/p>\n<p>If your team is preparing a 510(k), a CE technical file or a security update for devices already in the field, Bridge Global builds healthcare software with MDR, FDA, HIPAA and ISO requirements designed in from the start. Contact the team to discuss secure design, threat assessment, and the evidence trail for your next submission.<\/p>\n<!-- AddThis Advanced Settings generic via filter on the_content --><!-- AddThis Share Buttons generic via filter on the_content -->","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Cybersecurity evidence belongs in the safety case, not in a separate folder. Trace each threat to a hazard, the control that addresses it, and the verification evidence a reviewer can inspect. The FDA expects an SBOM for cyber devices, while &hellip;<!-- AddThis Advanced Settings generic via filter on get_the_excerpt --><!-- AddThis Share Buttons generic via filter on get_the_excerpt --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":165,"featured_media":58587,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1015],"tags":[2103,2104,2105,2106,2107],"class_list":["post-58588","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-healthcare","tag-medical-device-cybersecurity","tag-samd-cybersecurity","tag-fda-section-524b","tag-eu-mdr-cybersecurity","tag-iec-81001-5-1"],"featured_image_src":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/medical-device-cybersecurity-hospital-security.jpg","author_info":{"display_name":"Upendra Jith","author_link":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/author\/upendrajith\/"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58588","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/165"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=58588"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58588\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":58593,"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58588\/revisions\/58593"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/58587"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=58588"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=58588"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bridge-global.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=58588"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}